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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

A HIDDEN HOLE IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: TREATY POWER
VERSUS PROPERTY RIGHTS: A SUBSTITUTE,
FOR THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
By
ROBERT B. ELY, III*

Introduction
In the recent debates on the subject of treaty powers versus constitutional
guarantees, centering on the Bricker Amendments and proposed substitutes for it,1
major attention was paid to possible infringements by treaty, of personal liberties,
rather than of property rights.2
Proponents of the amendment made much of the likelihood that the United
States might adhere to the United Nations-sponsored Convention on Genocide, 3
the Draft International Convention on Human Rights, 4 or the Proposed Statute for
an International Criminal Court. 4a Dramatic pictures were drawn of American
citizens snatched from the bosom of their native land and haled before international courts, charged with crimes against international law and deprived of the fair

trial guaranteed by our Constitution.
Opponents of the Bricker Amendment made much of the fact that the United
States had not, in fact, adhered to any of these troublesome treaties, that there was

no likelihood of their doing so in the future and that if a treaty inconsistent with
constitutional guarantees were mad-e by the President and Senate, the whole Congress and the federal courts could be counted upon to restore the protection afforded
by the "Supreme Law of the Land".
Both sides sought to draw support from the now famous case of Fujii v. Calfornia.5 In that case the lower court had held that the provisions of the United
Nations Charter, to which the United States has adhered, made invalid the state's
Alien Land Law. This conclusion was reversed on appeal, on the ground that the
*B.S. Princeton University 1928; LL.B. University of Pennsylvania, 1931; Chairman Committee
on International Law Philadelphia Bar Association; member Pennsylvania and American Bar Associations; Counsel Insurance Company of North America.
1 S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong., 1st sess.; S. J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. 2d sess.; S. J. Res. 1, 83d Cong.,
the Knowland substitute, appearing in 99 Cong. Rec. 9757 of July 22, 1953; S.J. Res. 1, S.
1stsess.;
147, H. J. Res. 23, 27, 33, 41, 59, 60, 96, 99, 103, 111, 172, 84th Cong., 1st sess.
2 Phillips, "The Genocide Convention: its effect on our legal system", 35 A.B.A.J. 623; Holman,
"Treaty law-making: a blank check for writing a new constitution", 36 A.B.A.J. 707; Pearson,
Backus "Save the peace power: don't strait-jacket treaties", 39 A.B.A.J. 804; Hatch, "Treaty-making
power: 'an extraordinary power liable to abuse' ", 39 A.B.A.J. 808; MacChesney, McDougal, Matthews, Oliver, Ribble, "Treaty power and the Constitution: the case against amendment", 40 A.B.A.J.
203, 248; Hatch, Finch, Ober "-case for amendment", 40 A.B.A.J. 207, 252.
3 United Nations Document A/810, pp. 174-177; reprinted in 35 A.B.A.J. 52.
4 United Nations Document E/2447, pp. 39-50.
48 United Nations Document A/AC.48/4, 5, Sept. 1951. See Ely "A proposal for an international
criminal court; a critique and an alternative", 57 Dick. L. Rev. 46.
5 217 P.2d 481 (1950); 242 P.24 617, (1952).
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Charter was not a self-executing treaty. It is not difficult to see that these decisions
are a two-edged sword in the hands of either proponents or opponents of the Bricker
Amendment.
Actually, of course, since human conduct is never precisely predictable, no
one can say with certainty whether all future treaties will square with the Constibition, which of them will be self-executing, or how Congress and the courts will
react. The most that can be done is to examine the record of the past and to assume that the future will not depart greatly from it. If this procedure is followed
with respect to property rights, rather than personal liberties, in the field under discussion, a considerable volume of precedent can be unearthed on which to make
predictions.
Study of this data suggests, as a substitute for the Bricker Amendment (which
might hamper the conduct of our country's affairs by limiting the treaty power),
an amendment which would leave the treaty power untouched but would establish
beyond the power of Congress to abolish or amend the Court of Claims as a tribunal
with original jurisdiction to grant full relief whenever the treaty-making or other
powers of the United States had been used so as to impair the rights and privileges
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Type of Situation under Discussion
nor shall private property be
The Fifth Amendment provides in part "...
shall any person . . . be
"nor
taken for public use without just compensation",
deprived of . . . property without due process of law". How far has the treaty
power been used in the past so as to impinge upon these guarantees? If or when
this has been done, what remedies have been and are available to parties claiming
to have been aggrieved?
A citizen, or group of citizens, acquires a claim against a foreign government.
As discussed below, the claim may be based on national or international law; it
may sound in tort or in contract; and it may arise from transactions in the United
States, in the air, on the high seas or abroad. Other citizens may have identical or
similar claims arising out of the same or related transactions. After the claims
have arisen our Government, in order to preserve friendly relations with the foreign power involved or otherwise to promote our foreign policy, makes a treaty
whereby the claims of our citizens are taken over by our Government and released
to the foreign power. Our Government may or may not receive money consideration
for execution of this treaty, and this consideration may or may not be distributed
by our Government to the claimants.
Our history abounds with such situations. The following will suffice for
purposes of illustration of the type of treaty, as well as to indicate the reactions of
Congress and the courts.
(1) One of the earliest situations giving rise to claims against foreign sovereigns, based on torts under international law committed on the high seas, and later
barred by treaty, was the "spoliations" committed on American ships and cargoes
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by various European powers engaged in the general hostilities at the end of the
eighteenth century during Napoleon's rise to power.6 Each of the belligerents
sought to cut off enemy commerce and, regardless of the rights of neutrals, such as
the United States, seized and condemned American ships and cargoes on flimsy or
no pretext of carrying contraband. The principal offenders were England, France,
Spain, Denmark and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Our Government pressed
the claims of our citizens with varying results, summarized as follows:
Claims against Great Britain were settled through a provision in the Jay Treaty
of 1794 constituting a joint claims commission, pursuant to the decisions of which
Great Britain paid our citizens $11,600,000. 7 So far as concerns Spain, which had
acted as an ally of France and had permitted French authorities to condemn our
ships as prizes in Spanish waters, our Government, as one of the conditions of the
Treaty of 1819 ceding Florida to the United States, agreed to make satisfaction
for the claims of Americans against Spain.8 To fulfill this obligation, Congress
constituted a claims commission and paid its awards, totaling $4,000,000. Our
Government released Denmark in 1830, and The Two Sicilies in 1832, in consideration of payments of $650,000 and $1,900,000 respectively, which were distributed to our claimants.0 As to France, the results were mixed. With respect to
spoliations after 1801, France paid $5,000,000 to have a release under a treaty of
1831, and this sum was used to pay each claimant roughly sixty percent of his
claim. 10 With respect to spoliations prior to 1801, the French countered our claims
with assertions that the United States had violated the Treaty of Alliance of 1788,
by making the Jay Treaty of 1794 with England, then the enemy of France." In
return for the French withdrawal of this charge, our Government executed the
Treaty of 1800, by which the French were released from claims of our citizens,
without payment of any money consideration.' 2 For eighty-five years the disappointed claimants, originally about 900 in number 13 sought compensation from
the United States, invoking the provisions of the Fifth Amendment, quoted above,
but were neither paid nor permitted to sue. In 1885, the successors of the claimants
were permitted by a special act to petition the Court of Claims.' 4 This court, reported to Congress that the execution of the Treaty of 1800 amounted to a taking
"within the meaning and intent of the Constitution"' 5 and found that the barred
claims against France had amounted to some $7,000,000.16 Congress refused to
6 The history of these spoliations and of the settlements of them is fully discussed, with emphasis
on the French activities, in Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340, especially beginning at page 360.
7 See Bancroft Davis "Treaties and Conventions", 1014-1016.
8 Senate Executive Document 74, 49th Cong., 1st sess.
9 Treaty of March 28, 1830, with Denmark; Treaty of October 14, 1832, with The Two Sicilies.
10 See n. 8, supra.
11 As discussed in Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340.
12 8 Stat. 178 et seq.
13 See "Index of Awards" printed for the Court of Claims by the Government Printing Office, No.
48029-34-1.
14 Act of January 20, 1885, 23 Stat. 283.
1F Gray v. United States, 21 C. Cls. 340, affirmed after reargument in Cushing v. United States,
22 Ct. CI. 1.
16 See n. 13, supra.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV

VOL. 59

accept the view of the court. It has since appropriated, however, $3,900,000 to be
paid "by way of gratuities and not as of right" to certain claimants,' 7 leaving the
claims of some 200 "original sufferers" partly paid, and another 200 or more
18
wholly unpaid.
(2) A very early claim based on contract and arising abroad under Spanish
law was considered in Meade v. United States.' 9 There an American had rendered
services to Spain, which recognized as valid his claim for compensation, but which
had not paid it when negotiations were begun for the Florida cession. To facilitate
these negotiations, claimant turned over his claim to our Government. As indicated
above, the treaty finally executed released Spain in consideration, so far as this
claimant was concerned, of payment of certain funds, less than the amount of the
claim as liquidated by the Spanish Government. After extensive appeals to Congress by the claimant and his representatives, and after two Congressional references to the Court of Claims, the claim against the United States was rejected to
the extent that it exceeded the money paid by Spain. As discussed below, there
were conflicting statements by the court as to whether there had been a taking
20
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
(3) At the conclusion of each of the conflicts in which American citizens
have been injured during the period while the United States was not a belligerent,
similar situations have arisen. A typical case is that of the Black Tom sabotage
by German agents prior to our entry into World War I, giving rise to tort claims
under our law, settled through payment made by Germany in consideration of a
release and distributed through a claims commission. 21 There have been similar
claims against Germany, Japan, Italy and Yugoslavia arising out of injuries, under
international law, to American persons and property by those governments prior
to our entry into World War II. The Italian and Yugoslav peace treaties released
these claims in return for money payments to the United States, yet to be distributed. 22 The contractual agreement with the Federal German Republic and the
treaty with Japan leave these claims against those countries open for future negotia.

17

By Acts of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 862, 897; March 3, 1889, 30 Stat. 1161, 1191; May 27,

1902, 32 Stat. 207, 217; February 24, 1905, 33 Stat. 743, 780. As to the nature of these payments
as purported "gratuities", see Blagge v. Balch, 162 U. S. 439, 457; 16 Sup. Ct. 856, 857, 40 L. Ed.

1032 (1896).
19 See n. 13, supra.
1.

2 Ct. Cls. 224.

20
21

See p. 7, below.
The history of these proceedings is well summarized in Z and F Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull,

311 U. S. 470, 61 Sup. Ct. 351, 85 L.Ed. 288 (1941).

22 For text of these treaties see 61 Stat. 1369 as to Italy, and 62 Stat. 2133 as to Yugoslavia. In
Rubin "The almost forgotten claimant: American citizens' property rights violated", 40 A.B.A.J.
961, there is an interesting discussion of the situation arising (with respect to Rumania) where the
United States, instead of receiving money consideration, is given by treaty the right to seize the
property of a foreign power or its nationals and apply the proceeds to the claims of the United States
and of American nationals.
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tion.23 It remains to be seen whether claimants for war damage by these former enemies will receive full compensation either from those countries or from our
2
government. 3a
(4) An approximately converse situation arose during our Civil War when
the British assisted the South by supplying the "Alabama" and other men-of-war
which preyed upon northern commerce, contrary to international law. The claims
of our citizens were settled by the British payment of $15,000,000, distributed
24
through a claims commission.
(5) Apart from situations like the foregoing, each of which involves a group
of similarly situated American citizens, whose claims are disposed of en masse
by a treaty, there is a steady stream of claims against foreign governments by our
citizens for injuries under international law, presented to our State Department
for "espousal" by the United States and settlement on the basis of individual diplomatic negotiation and agreement. According to a recent article in The American
25
Journal of InternationalLaw:
"In the 1930's (when only some 13,000 Americans resided abroad),

claims presented to the Department of State on behalf of American citizens injured abroad in alleged violation of international law aggregated,
on an average, more than a thousand a year. This number has been greatly
increased by the disorders resulting from World War II, and by the fact

that the number of Americans residing abroad has now jumped to over
half a million."
These claims may be based on anything, from being shot down in an airplane on
peaceful flight, 26 to denial of trading rights under a treaty of friendship and commerce. The claims may be settled by payments obtained from the wrongdoing government, or they may drag through diplomatic maneuvers until the claimant, or
his descendants, become disheartened and abandon the matter, or the claims may
be released en mass-e as part of national rearrangements with the government concerned.
23 The Contractual Agreement with Germany is, of course, purely an interim arrangement
pending a formal peace treaty, which has since been ratified by the United States.
The 18th Article of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (Dept. of State Publication 4561) provides, in
part "The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to
consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which
arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented or re-presented by the Government of one of the allied Powers ... "
23u Under the Paris Reparations Agreement of 1946 German property vested by the American
Alien Property Custodian was to be applied to war claims of American citizens. However, there
was introduced in the last Congress, and is now pending before the 84th Cong, a bill (S. 995)
which would return this vested property to the former enemy alien owners. Compare this with provisions of P.L. 744, 84th Cong., c. 1162 providing for the application of vested Japanese property
to certain war claims against that government.
24 For a discussion of these arrangements see United States v. Weld, 127 U.S. 51, 8 Sup. Ct. 1000,
32 L.Ed. 62 (1888).
25 Cowles "Review of the United Nations Charter and the Adjudication of International Claims",
48 Am. J. Int'l. L. 460.
26 According to the New York Journal of Commerce the Chinese Communists have agreed to pay
£367,000 as damages for injuries incurred by the shooting down on July 23, 1954, of a Cathay
Pacific plane en route from Bangkok to Hong Kong.
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Questions and Answers, if Any
Whenever, by treaty, our Government takes over the claim of a citizen against
a foreign power and releases that power, a series of important constitutional questions arise, some of substance and some of procedure. The answers to the substantive
questions seem quite clear, but procedural complications make them seem much
less dear in practice. The phrase "the Supreme Law of the Land", used in the
Constitution to describe that document, becomes a mockery if procedural difficulties are permitted to destroy the rights guaranteed.
(a) Is there a taking of private property, within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment when there is made a treaty of the type under discussion? An affirmative answer appears to be clearly established, at least in theory.
In the Meade case, sutpra,27 the Court of Claims had before it a claim against
the United States alleging a "taking" by means of a treaty releasing a contractual
obligation of Spain to the plaintiff. The claim was dismissed by vote of three
judges on procedural grounds. One judge based his opinion on the theory that
the plaintiff was bound by the adverse report of a commission to which Congress
had referred him. One judge wrote no opinion. The third felt there had been no
taking, since the plaintiff had voluntarily 'entrusted his claim to the United States
with full discretion as to settlement and was bound to accept whatever arrangements were made with Spain. On the question of whether the Fifth Amendment
afforded protection in the absence of these procedural difficulties, however, the
majority and the minority concurred. For the majority it was said:
"Was the release and cancellation of Meade's claim against Spain
such an appropriation of private property to public use as comes within
the rules of law and the provision of the Constitution? The court think it
was. A man's choses in action, the debts due him, are as much property and
as sacred in the eye of the law as are his houses and lands, his
horses and his cattle. And when taken for the public good, or released
be paid for
or cancelled to secure 2an
8 object of public importance, are to
in the same manner."
For the minority it was said:
"The naked claims of American citizens against foreign governments, unstablished, and unacknowledged, the government may renounce
with or without consideration, and it can be held liable only for the consideration it receives and in the manner provided by treaty or by statute.
But the property of an American citizen, whether it consists of material
objects, or whether it be only an incorporal evidence of debt, can be taken
from him only upon the condition prescribed by the Constitution of the
United States, and that condition is, that he shall receive just compensation ...."29
These two opinions seem to have settled the basic theories where the claim
against the foreign sovereign is contractual in nature, while casting doubt in the
27
28
29

Affirmed in 9 Wall. 691; 19 L. Ed. 687 (1869).
2 Ct. Cl. 275.
2 Ct. Cl. 318-319.
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case of torts. However, any doubts on the latter would seem to have been put to
rest by the later Court of Claims decision in Gray v. United States30 in which the
claims against France had been for wrongful seizures of ships and cargoes. In reporting to Congress its conclusions as to the liability of the United States the court
had this to say with respect to the treaty barring these claims:
"It seems to us that this 'bargain' (again using Madison's word), by
which the present peace and quiet of the United States, as well as their
future prosperity and greatness were largely secured, and which was
brought about by the sacrifice of the interests of individual citizens, falls
within the intent and meaning of the Constitution, which prohibits the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation. "8 1
Thus it is settled that the making of a treaty barring claims of a citizen against
a foreign power amounts to a taking, whether the claims sound in contract or in
tort. The true distinction between these two classes of claims is only relevant in
answer to the next question.
(b) What is the measure of "just compensation" for such a taking? Here, as
in other eminent domain cases, the hornbook rule is well established. Stated in
general terms, the person whose property is taken is entitled to be paid the market
value of the property at the time of taking, and if there be delay in payment, he is
delay", measured in terms of
likewise entitled to "additional compensation for
32
interest at going rates on the principal amount.
It is a bit difficult, however, to apply this rule where the claim is against a
foreign sovereign. What is the "market value" of such a claim?
In some instances, as where the claim is upon a contract such as bonds issued
by that sovereign and claimed to be in default (as was the situation discussed in
Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council,3 3 ) there is an actual market
from which quotations can be gotten. Again, even when the similar claims of a
group of citizens are in tort, there may be sufficient trading in these claims to
establish a market. For example, it appears in the records of the Court of Claims
on French spoliations s4 that holders of these claims were able to and did sell the
same at or near the estimated value of the property seized.
In other types of eminent domain cases than those of taking-by-treaty, here
under discussion, the absence of sufficient sales and purchases to constitute a market
has not prevented an award of "just compensation". As the Supreme Court said
in Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States,3 5 in which the Government requisitioned
a building contract for a partially completed ship, what the courts should do in
such a case is to consider all the circumstances and compute, as nearly as may be,
30
31
32
33
34
35

21 Ct. Cl. 340.
21 Ct. C1. 394.

Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 17; 54 Sup. Ct. 26, 27; 78 L. Ed. 142 (1933).
133 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1954).
See docket Nos. 1535 and 5268.
251 U.S. 396, 44 Sup. Ct. 471, 64 L. Ed. 323 (1920).
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"the sum which will put [the party whos'e property is taken] in as good a position
pecuniarily as [he] would have been in if [his] property had not been taken"36
Even when thus modified, however, the rule for computing "just compensation" still presents difficulty when the property taken is a claim against a foreign
sovereign, due to a combination of theoretical and practical considerations. In determining the worth of such claims, prior to a treaty barring them, consideration must
be given to the means and probability of collecting them.
If the foreign sovereign has liquidated and admitted the validity of the claim,
then it would seem that our courts would be obliged to find th-e claim to be worth
the face amount at which it had been liquidated. It must be assumed that a foreign
37
sovereign will meet its just debts; since, as the court said in the Fraziercase, "Our
courts, for influential reasons of international comity, are without jurisdiction to
pass upon a cause which involves the determination that a foreign sovereign has
forfeited on its contractual obligation."
Where the foreign sovereign has admitted the validity of the claim, but it has
not been liquidated, the foregoing rule of international comity still applies, but our
courts are free to perform the task of liquidation, since they are merely doing what
the foreign sovereign itself would do if it carried out the presumed performance
of its admitted obligation. Such was the situation in the previously mentioned French
spoliation cases. As the court said in the Gray case, "the claims being valid obligations admitted by the French Government", the court proceeded under special
act of Congress to report "the validity and amount" of "valid claims to indemnity
upon the French Government arising out of illegal captures, detentions, seizures,
condemnations, and confiscations", fixing the amount in each case as the worth
of the ship, cargo, or both.
It is only where the claim against the foreign sovereign has been neither admitted nor liqidated that there is any real difficulty, for then there is no basis for
the presumption of faithful performance of the foreign sovereign. To make such
a presumption would require the double hypothesis that the sovereign would consent to be sued, and that if sued the claimant would prevail. Of course, in the
case of countries such as England, where the Crown has consented, by an act similar
to our Federal Tort Claims Act to be suable generally like a private subject, one
hypothesis becomes a reality. But for the treaty barring the claim, which would
wipe out the right to sue, claimant would have been able to have his claim liquidated
36 By way of elaboration the court said: "The value of such ships at the time of requisition, and
the then probable value at the time fixed for delivery, the contract price, the payments made and
to be made, the time to elapse before completion and delivery, the possibility that by reason of the
government's action in control of materials, etc., the contractor might not be able to complete the ship
at the date fixed for performance, the loss of use of money to be sustained, the amount of other
expenditures to be made between the time of requisition and delivery, together with other pertinent
facts, are to be taken into account and given proper weight to determine the amount claimant lost
by the taking."
37 At 133 N.Y.S.2d 609.
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in the foreign court of claims. 38 There would seem to be no reason why, in order
to establish his measure of just compensation, he should not call upon our courts
to take the place of the foreign tribunal in determining the worth of his claim.
On the other hand, where the foreign sovereign has not given such a blanket
consent to be sued, then as the Supreme Court said in Blagge v. Balch,3- the claims
can only be enforced against the foreign sovereign through diplomacy or by a declaration of war. Hence in this case, only, can it be said that the claim against the
foreign sovereign is worth no more than our Government in fact is able to obtain.
Thus it is clear that (a) there is a taking within the Fifth Amendment when
our Government executes a treaty barring claims of our citizens against a foreign
sovereign, and (b) "just compensation" is to be computed on the basis of what the
foreign sovereign has agreed to pay where the claim is admitted and liquidated, or
what our courts find it should pay where the claim is admitted but unliquidated,
or whatever our Government in fact obtains where the claim is neither admitted nor
liquidated. There remains the final and crucial question.
(c) What remedies are available to compel the payment of "just compensation" in such cases? Here again, theoretical answers are not hard to find. The basic
guarantee of "due process" by the Fifth Amendment, has been quoted above. Interpreting this clause, the Supreme Court has said in Monongahela Navigation Co.

v. United States:

40

"... Congress seems to have assumed the right to determine what
shall be the measure of compensation. But this is a judicial and not a legislative question. The legislature may determine what private property is
needed for public purposes - that is a question of a political and legislative character; but when the taking has been ordered, then the question
of compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the public, taking the
property, through Congress or the legislature, its representative, to say
what compensation sha be aid, or even what shall be the rule of compensation. The constitution has declared that just compensation shall be
paid, and the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry." [Emphasis
added.]
this court later said in Baltimore and Ohio RailElaborating on this decision,
4
road Co. v. United States: '
"The just compensation clause may not be evaded or impaired by any
form of legislation. Against the objection of the owner of private property
taken for public use, the Congress may not directly or through any legislalative agency finally determine the amount that is safeguarded to him by
that clause. If as to the value of his property the owner accepts legislative
or administrative determinations or challenges them merely upon the
'18 Whereas the making of such a treaty bars this right to sue in this connection see Ozanic v. United
States, 188 F.2d 228, in which it was held that an agreement of mutual release between Yugoslavia
and the United States amounted to a withdrawal of the consent of the United States to be sued on
claims within the scope of the agreement.
39

162 U.S. 439, 16 Sup. Ct. 853, 40 L. Ed. 1032 (1896).

40

148 U.S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. Ed. 463 (1893).

41

298 U.S. 349, 56 Sup. Ct. 797, 80 L. Ed. 1209 (1936).
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ground that they were not made in accordance with statutes governing a
subordinate agency, no constitutional question arises. But, when he appropriately invokes the just compensation clause, he is entitled to a judicial
determination of the amount. The due process clause assures a full hearing
before the court or other tribunal empowered to perform the judicial
function involved." [Emphasis added.]
From these statements it would seem at first blush that there is and always
would be easily at hand full protection, in the form of a suit against the Government, for any citizen whose property was taken and given away by treaty. Analysis
of our history and of our present law, however, will show that such protection has
not always been available and ,in the absence of constitutional amendment, may not
always remain available in the future. While the Supreme Court has said that the
due process clause guarantees judicial review of contested claims for just compensation, access to the courts is wholly at the whim of Congress and will remain so
unless and until the Constitution is amended.
Claimants of just compensation for takings of their property by treaty have
become the least well off of any class of claimants asserting constitutional rights
against the Government. During the first sixty odd years of our history no citizen
had any tribunal in which he might bring suit against the Government. In 1855
the Court of Claims was established to handle any claim against the United States
which Congress might refer to it.42 During the first twelve years of its existence,
however, this court had no power to enter final judgment, and, as the Supreme
Court has since said,4" it acted during this period merely in the capacity of an
"auditor" or "comptroller" for Congress. In 1867 the Court of Claims was given
true judicial power, 44 but with exclusions of various types of claims, which have
consistently discriminated against claimants for taking by treaty and certain other
classes.
The Act of 1867 gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims "founded
upon any law of Congress, except for pensions, or upon any Regulation of an
Executive Department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States". However, in addition to excluding so-called Civil
War claims and claims previously reported adversely, the Act of 1867 continued an
exclusion of any claim "growing out of or dependent on any treaty stipulation
entered into with foreign nations or with the Indian tribes", found in the earlier
Act of 1863.

42 Act of February 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612.
43

The history of the Court of Claims is fully discussed in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S.

553; 53 Sup. Ct. 751, in which it was held that this tribunal was not a "constitutional court", so as
to prevent reduction of salary of judge thereof. Note, however, that by P.L. 158, 83d Cong. c. 253,

the court has now been "declared to be a court established under Article III of the Constitution."

44 Act of 1867, c. 19; 14 Stat. 9, repealing the provision of § 14 of the Act of March 3, 1863,
C. 92, 12 Stat. 765, which had made judgments of the Court of Claims payable only after review by the

Secretary of the Treasury.
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For some time after the passage of the Act of 1867 there was doubt as tc
whether it authorized suits against the Government for just compensation in eminent domain cases, generally, and in the case of takings-by-treaty, in particular. The
affirmative was supported by the decision in Grant's case, 45 and by dictum in the
Meade case, on the theory that when a taking occurs there is an "implied contract"
by the Government to pay compensation. This "implied contract" theory was followed by the Supreme Court in United States v. North American Transportation
and Trading Co.,46 but it was rejected by Chief Justice Hughes in the Jacobs case,
when he said:
"The right to recover just compensation . . . was guaranteed by the
Constitution. . . .It rested on the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary ......

Since then all claims for just compensation have been recognized as resting
47
on the Constitution, rather than on implied contract.
Moreover, not only was there doubt whether claims for takings by treaty
came within the classes authorized by the Act of 1867, but there was also doubt
whether they did not fall within the class of claims excluded as founded upon a
treaty. These doubts have yet to be settled. In Eastern Extension, Australasia and
China Telegraph Co. v. United States,48 a British corporation sued the United

States in the Court of Claims for failure to carry out, after annexation of the Philippines, a contract previously made by the plaintiff with Spain, the former sovereign
of those islands. On appeal the Supreme Court indicated that the claim was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, if considered as dependent upon
the treaty of cession, or upon principles of international law applicable thereto. The
case was remitted, however, in order to permit plaintiff to show liability under
national law, on the basis of an implied contract. Nevertheless, as the Supreme
Court decided on later appeal, 49 there was no express assumption by the United
States of th% contract with Spain and no implied promise. The plaintiff did not
assert any claim of "taking" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, so that
issue was not decided.
Thus the Act of 1867 afforded at best a doubtful remedy for citizens claiming
their property to have been taken and given away by treaty. Moreover, they were
cut off from the remedy provided in eminent domain cases generally, as to which
it had long been the custom of Congress to provide, at first in particular acts, and
later by general legislation, for condemnation proceedings, sometimes in state as
well as in federal courts, when the power of eminent domain was to be exercised,
46
46

1 Ct. Cl. 41.
253 U.S. 330, 40 Sup. Ct. 518, 64 L. Ed. 935 (1920).

A7 There might be some justification for the "implied contract" theory where the government
concedes the existence of property and the fact of taking on the basis of the maxim that the king
can do no wrong, but this justification disappears whenever the government questions either of
these facts.
48

231 U.S. 326, 34 Sup. Ct. 57, 58 L. Ed. 250 (1913).

49

251 U.S. 355, 363, 40 Sup. Ct. 168, 170, 64 L. Ed. 305 (1920).
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and for assessment of just compensation by the court during those proceedings.5 0
In takings-by-treaty, however, no condemnation proceedings are either necessary
or customary, since the taking is accomplished by the mere act of ratifying the
treaty.
In 1885, one particular class of claimants for a taking-by-treaty was granted
51
access to the Court of Claims on a curiously limited basis. By the Act of 1885,
French Spoliation claimants were permitted to secure from the court findings as
to the validity and amount of their claims against France barred by the Treaty of
1800, and the court was directed to report to Congress its conclusions as to the liability of the United States. There is strong evidence in the legislative history of this
act 52 that Congress intended these reports to be conclusive as to liability, but merely
interlocutory as to extent of damages and parties to be paid, all original individual
claimants having long since died. Moreover, the rules announced in the Monongahela
and th-e Baltimore and Ohio cases, supra, would seem to compel this effect. However, Section 6 of the act provided that the reports should not "conclude either the
claimant or the Congress", and the Court of Claims has later said in Insurance Company of North America v. United States,5 3 that it was not authorized to do more than
54
act in an advisory capacity.
In 1887, by the Tucker Act, 55 the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was extended to include claims "founded on the Constitution". On its face, this would
permit suits for takings-by-treaty founded on the "just compensation" clause of
the Fifth Amendment, without need to invoke the "implied contract" theory.
The Tucker Act, however, still contained two stumbling blocks, one particularly applicable to claimants for takings-by-treaty prior to 1881, the other applicable
to all alike. The Tucker Act contained the provision that "no suit against the Government of the United States shall be allowed under this Act unless the same
shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued for which claim is
made". Hence this act afforded no relief where, as in the French spoliation cases,
the treaty was executed and the constitutional right, apart from the right to sue,
arose prior to 1881. Furthermore, the Tucker Act did not repeal the previous exclusion of claims founded on treaty.
As was said by the Supreme Court in Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499, 16 Sup. Ct. 397,
400, 40 L. Ed. 510 (1896). "It is now well settled that whenever, in the execution of the powers
granted to the United States by the constitution, lands in any state are needed by the United States
for a fort, magazine, dockyard, lighthouse, customhouse, courthouse, post office, or any other
public purpose, and cannot be acquired by agreement with the owners, the Congress of the United
States, exercising the right of eminent domain, and making just compensation to the owners, may
authorize such lands to be taken, either by proceedings in the courts of the state with its consent,
or by proceedings in the courts of the United States with or without any consent or concurrent
act of the state, as Congress may direct or permit."
51 23 Stat. 283.
52 See S. Rep. No. 306, 48th Cong., 2d Sess.; Cong. Rec., 48th Cong. 2d Sess., p. 700.
53 121 F. Supp. 649; cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 88; rehearing denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 206.
64 Bills (H.R. 481 and 2223, 84th Cong.) are now pending designed to give the court the power
to enter final judgment on these claims.
55 24 Stat. 505.
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In the 1911 revision of the Judicial Code,5 6 the Tucker Act exclusion of suits
where the right on which the claim was based accrued more than six years previously was 'eliminated. Instead it was provided, "Every claim against the United States
cognizable by the Court of Claims shall be forever barred unless the petition . . .
is filed ... within six years after the claim first accrues". The Tucker Act provision
had been both an exclusion and a limitation, since it both withheld the right to sue
where the substantive right had accrued more than six years previously, and cut off
after six years the right to sue in any case. The provision in the Act of 1911 was one
cf limitation only. Apparently, except for the continuing doubtful exclusion of
claims founded on treaty, this would have given claimants for takings-by-treaty
prior to 1881, excluded by the Tucker Act, a new right to sue, which they were
obliged to exercise prior to 1917. To avoid such an argument, however, the committee preparing the 1911 act eliminated the outstanding class of claims, French
spoliation, which might have tested this theory, by a notation that the act did
not apply to them. 57
Even at the present time, the remedies available to claimants for takings-bytreaty remain doubtful, at best. The latest general revision of the Judicial Code 8
occurred in 1948. This revision continues the Court of Claims' general jurisdiction 5 9
over "claims founded on the Constitution". Furthermore, it has only the limitation
of the Act of 1911, cutting off rights to sue after six years, 60 rather than the Tucker
Act's combined limitation and exclusion, forbidding suits where the rights involved
are more than six years old. Apart from the exclusions of claims for pensions6 '
and claims founded on treaty stipulation, 62 all previous exclusions, such as for Civil
War claims and claims previously reported adversely, have disappeared.
With the Judicial Code in this shape, the way would seem to be clear for suits
alleging a taking-by-treaty. However, the decision of the Court of Claims in the
North America case, supra, and the failure of the Supreme Court to review, leaves
this reasoning in doubt. It will be recalled that the taking alleged in that case
occurred in 1800, more than six years prior to passage of the Tucker Act. In reaching the conclusion that it had no "jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the claim
at this time", the Court of Claims refers to the provisions of the Tucker Act as "the
statute of limitations" and goes on to say that it can "find no language in any of
the acts which have been passed which shows an intention on the part of the Congress to waive the statute of limitations in this case, nor any language in any general renewal statute under which the claim might be presented".
The Government did not raise in the North America case any question as to
whether the exclusion of claims founded on treaty stipulation would have barred
66

March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1093.
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S. Rep. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 158.
Title 28 U.S.C.
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June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 1491, 62 Stat. 869.
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Ibid., § 2501.
Ibid., § 1501.
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Ibid., §
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the suit had the claim been less ancient, and the Court says nothing on this point.
The solution to this problem must await further litigation, which may arise under
more recent treaties barring claims of Americans against foreign governments.
There is, however, one point stressed by the court in the North America case,
requiring re-emphasis. Having stated its conclusion that Congress had never provided for judicial review of French spoliation claims, based on the Constitution
and now more than a century and a half old, the Court of Claims states, "This is a
matter which is in the discretion of Congress". [Emphasis added.]
Since one is here concerned with constitutional rights and since th'e "due
process" clause has been held to guarantee judicial review when these rights are
questioned in eminent domain cases, 6 3 the court might better have said that the
withholding of the right to sue was within the "power", rather than the "discretion" of Congress. The distinction, however, is largely academic, as the following
discussion makes clear.
Even though Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, provides that "The
judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution.. ." including "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party",
no provision is made for automatic exercise of that power. Section 1 of Article III
provides that "the judicial Powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish".
[Emphasis added.]
No provision is made elsewhere for the compensation and tenure of the
Supreme Court. An Act of Congress was required to bring it into being. 6 4 An act
to absolish it, however, once established, would probably be held unconstitutional.
Moreover, the existence of the Supreme Court is no protection to claimants
alleging infringement of constitutional rights and seeking judicial review. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 65 includes only "cases aff'ecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a state shall be a
Party". In all other cases the Supreme Court has only appellate jurisdiction "with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make".
As the Supreme Court said in Kline v. Burke Construction Co. :66
"Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from
the Constitution. Every other court created by th'e general government
derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body
may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided
it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution....
The Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take
jurisdictionin the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to
confer it." [Emphasis added.]
C13 See n's. 40 and 41 supra.
C4 The Judiciary Act of 1789.
65 Art. III,§ 2, C1. 2.
66 260 U.S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 67 L. Ed. 226 (1922).
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Hence there is no remedy for enforcing the right of just compensation for a
taking-by-treaty, except as Congress gives permission to sue. Moreover, there is
-even debate as to whether and how such a permission, once given, may be withdrawn. 67 In any case, there is no legal method of compelling Congress to give its
consent.
A Resume of the Situation
Judicial opinion is unanimous, to the following effect:
(1) A taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment occurs whenever
a treaty is made whereby a foreign sovereign is released from claims of our citizens against it.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees here, as in other cases of eminent domain, that "just compensation" shall be paid.
(2)

(3) There is no question as to the fulfillment of this guarantee when, as is
usually the case, our Government obtains a money consideration for the release and
establishes procedures for the distribution to the claimants, and when the claimants
accept this distribution.
(4) Likewise, there is no question as to the fulfillment of the guarantee when,
having obtained no consideration for the release of the foreign power, our Government makes appropriations, as in certain French spoliation cases, to pay the claimants and the claimants accept these sums.
(5) To back up the guarantee of just compensation, the "due process" clause
supposedly insures a judicial review of disputed claims, as where the Government
questions the fact of taking or the claimant questions the amount of compensation.
(6) Since, however, under the Constitution as written, the judiciary has no
power to act without congressional authority, Congress has complete power to
determine how and when, if at all, such judicial review is to be obtained.
(7) History affords no ground for complete confidence that, under th'e
Constitution as now written, there will always be a tribunal available to citizens
who assert claims for just compensation where their property has been taken by
tr'eaty and given to a foreign power, or who seek the judicial review guaranteed by
the "due process" clause when such a claim is questioned by the Government.
In at least one instance a group of claimants originally numbering more than 450,
with claims reported to be valid by the Court of Claims in what it now calls "advis-

67 See the remarks of the Court of Claims in Seery v. United States 127 F. Supp. 601, 607 (1955).
"It is probably still law that Congress could effectively destroy a citizen's constitutional right such
as, for example, the right to just compensation ... by a statute withdrawing the government's consent to be sued"; but compare Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 Sup. Ct., 840 78 L. Ed.
1434 (1934) in which the Supreme Court refused to recognize a repeal of a previously given consent to sue on government insurance policies."
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ory opinions", have been kept waiting for a century and a half for either payment
or judicial review.
(8) The situation under discussion extends far beyond cases of citizens whose
mere property is taken by treaty. The problem here discussed would arise as well
in cases, such as have thus far been high-lighted in the Bricker debates, where
treaties might endanger the guarantees of life and liberty, also written into the
Constitution. Again, it is not by treaty alone that such guarantees may be weakened
or avoided. Moreover, while paym'ent of compensation might suffice to make
amends for property taken, only mandatory or injunctive process would serve to
safeguard life and liberty.
The Remedy
From all of the foregoing, it would appear that the time is now ripe to write
into the Constitution, thus beyond touching by mere Act of Congress, a self-executing guarantee of protection against infringement of constitutional rights and privileges. The Court of Claims is now in existence. Enumerating it in Article
III, Section I, as follows, would prevent its abolition. "The judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in, one supreme court, in a court of claims, and in such
other inferior courts as the Congress may . . ordain and establish." The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims could be made similarly immune from congressional
amendment by adding to Section 2, clause 3 of Article III a new sentence reading,
"In all controversies to which the United States is a party, in which it is asserted
that an act of the United States has infringed any right or privilege guaranteed by
this Constitution, the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to grant full judicial
relief".
In the earliest days of its history, when the United States could ill afford the
financial strain or embarrassment of suits against it by its citizens, there was some
justification, although least of all with respect to constitutional claims, for permitting Congress to pick and choose, on grounds of political expediency, the suits it
would allow. 68 Today, when the country is firmly established, and when Congress
has already seen fit to grant to citizens the right to sue even on tort claims, as to
which it was once held that the Government had merely a moral obligation, 69 the
time is more than ripe to make the Constitution self-executing so far as concerns
all the guarantees of personal and property rights written into "the Supreme Law
of the Land".
68 For example, when the French Spoliation claims first arose in 1800 they were estimated to
amount to as much as $20,000,000, to pay which would have required the entire tax income of the
Federal Government for the next two decades.
69 By the Federal Tort Claims Act of Aug. 2, 1946, 60 Stat. 843 and amendments, 28 U.S.C.A., 171.
See the remarks of Frankfurter, J. in Nat'l City Bank of N. Y. v. Republic of China U.S. -,
75 Sup. Ct. 423, 426 (1955), "But even the immunity enjoyed by the United States as territorial
sovereign is a legal doctrine which has not been favored by the test of time. It has increasingy been
found to be in conflict with the growing subjection of governmental action to the moral judgment",
and the discussion which follows.
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As indicated above, the amendment which would accomplish this purpose
could be xtremely simple and would be inportant in the same degree. Such an
amendment would not hamper the treaty-making power to any greater extent than
is already stated in the Constitution. Neither the treaty power nor the Bill of Rights
contains any 'explicit limitation. However, unless and until there is established and
placed beyond the power of Congress to amend or abolish, a tribunal capable of
enforcing the Bill of Rights, the treaty power has a practical ascendancy which the
wording of the Constitution does not warrant.

